the french began to leave vietnam when what fell to vietnamese forces in 1959?
| War in Vietnam (1954–1959) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Role of the Vietnam War, Indochina Wars and Cold State of war | ||||||||
 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles greet Southward Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem | ||||||||
| ||||||||
| Belligerents | ||||||||
| Anti-Communist forces:  Usa | Communist forces:  China | Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo and Bình Xuyên militias (until 1955) | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
 Ngô Đình Diệm Lâm Quang Thi Dwight D. Eisenhower |  Hồ Chí Minh Lê Duẩn Trường Chinh Nguyễn Chí Thanh | |||||||
| Casualties and losses | ||||||||
| United states: 9 killed[1] | ||||||||
The 1954 to 1959 phase of the Vietnam State of war was the era of the ii nations. Coming after the Outset Indochina War, this menstruum resulted in the military defeat of the French, a 1954 Geneva meeting that partitioned Vietnam into Northward and South, and the French withdrawal from Vietnam (see First Indochina War), leaving the Democracy of Vietnam regime fighting a communist insurgency with United states aid. During this menstruation, North Vietnam recovered from the wounds of war, rebuilt nationally, and accrued to prepare for the anticipated war. In South Vietnam, Ngô Đình Diệm consolidated ability and encouraged anti-communism. This period was marked by U.S. support to South Vietnam before Gulf of Tonkin, also as communist infrastructure-building.
The period ended with major negotiations, but formal discussions had started as early equally 1950, with less formal meetings during and immediately after the 2nd World War. France gave express autonomy in February 1950, Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) within the French Union.[ii] The enabling agreement was signed among the five states on 23 December 1950, and was the prerequisite for direct U.Due south. aid to Indochina.
U.S. missions to Indochina [edit]
U.S. assist to the non-Communist forces of the area had started in 1950, both with materiel and assistance to the French doing the chief grooming. It had to wait for U.South. assistance was administered by the War machine Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (MAAG-I), which had been established in October 1950 under the command of brigadier general (BG) Francis G. Brink, followed by major general (MG) T.J.H. Trapnell.
Starting in 1952, a more senior officeholder, lieutenant full general (LTG) John Westward. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.S. Ground forces, Pacific (USARPAC), made 3 fact-finding trips to France, after Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, dying of cancer, had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on ane April 1952, and subsequently General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. While he had no effect on French operations, he did build relationships. O'Daniel had been a partitioning commander during the Korean War, and so was not unknown since the French had forces in that war.[3]
Nevertheless, the relationships both with the French and Vietnamese changed with the French defeat and gradual withdrawal. French trainers did not abruptly withdraw in 1954 after the Geneva accords, and, indeed, there was a French desire to stay involved in training the South Vietnamese. Office of this may have been pride, and partially a desire to maintain French influence.
France'south painful withdrawal may accept led to its lack of cooperation in European defense arrangements that included the United states of america. France rejected European Defence force Community on August 30, 1954, possibly to give thanks the Soviets for help at Geneva. Simply it is certain that many French were persuaded that the U.S. and the Britain furnished inadequate support to France during the latter phases of the state of war, and at the Conference. And it is equally sure that American policy in the aftermath of Geneva widely alienated affection for the U.S. in France, and created that lack of confidence which the Suez crisis of summer, 1956, translated into outright distrust.
All the foregoing tension resolved to two fundamental problems betwixt the United states and France. The offset was the question of how and by whom Vietnam'due south armed forces were to be trained. In improver, the Geneva accords limited the number of directorate that could be assigned, and specified that equipment could be replaced, just that no additional quantities be given. These agreements were ignored by all.
The 2nd, and more than far-reaching, was whether Ngô Đình Diệm was to remain at the head of Vietnam's regime, or whether he was to be replaced by another nationalist leader more than sympathetic to Bảo Đại and France. The outset issue was resolved relatively quickly. General Collins struck an understanding with Full general Ely in Vietnam by which, despite serious misgivings in Paris, France agreed to turn over the training of the Vietnamese army to the U.S. and to withdraw French cadres.
US personnel dealing with the Regime of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. The diplomats were non getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and then lacks the resources to assemble and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, abuse, connections, and then on."[4]
Likewise, afterwards the end of French rule, Lao people's democratic republic became independent, but with a struggle there amongst political factions, with neutralists heading the authorities and a strong Pathet Lao insurgency. Laos, also not to have had strange military involvement according to the Geneva agreement, quickly had the beginnings of U.S. interest too equally the continuing effects of Northward Vietnam sponsoring the Pathet Lao.
Communist strategy [edit]
In a department titled "The Viet Minh Residue", the Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defence Vietnam Task Forcefulness or "Pentagon Papers" cited a study of 20-3 Viet Minh who, according to U.S. analysts, told consistent stories of beingness given stay-backside roles by the Viet Minh leadership going north. Some were given political roles, while others were told to look orders:
It is quite articulate that even the activists were non instructed to organize units for guerrilla war, merely rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections, and the normalization of relations with the Northward. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the ICC, and up until mid-1956, most held on to the belief that the elections would accept place. They were disappointed in two respects: not only were the promised elections not held, but the amnesty which had been bodacious by the Geneva Settlement was denied them, and they were hounded by the Anti-Communist campaign. After 1956, for the nearly office, they went "underground."[5]
The Viet Minh went clandestine in 1956, but there was no major decision until 1959. A 1964 interrogation written report likewise included in the Pentagon Papers determined:
The period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in Due south Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed past the Communist Party could not exist carried out due to the arrest of a number of political party members past RVN regime. The people's agitation motility was minimized. However, the organizational organisation of the party from the highest to the lowest echelons survived, and since the party remained close to the people, its activities were not completely suppressed. In 1959 the political party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and past the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly.[five]
Southern strategy [edit]
After partition, the Due south worked on defining an identity. Its core had been Buddhist, merely also had a number of influential groups, some religious and some only taking power. Now, hundreds of thousands, close to a million, Northern refugees, by and large Catholic, joined the gauge five million population in the South.
Diệm, who was backed past the U.South. was an Annamite, from Central Vietnam (although not the Primal Highlands) in the South upon taking ability. In seeking political support from Southerners, he was not nearly as visible as Bảo Đại, nor was he seen as sympathetic to Buddhism or the smaller minorities. Diệm had to create a viable alternative to the Viet Minh in those areas where the French had provided security, both the cities and towns, but as well in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the regional or "folk" religions, such as the Cao Đài. The existing upper form might be wealthy, but the French had found information technology was neither popular nor internally cohesive.[half dozen]
While the Communists certainly had external assistance, they still considered themselves Vietnamese Communists. Clearly, pure geography would prevent them from being a Soviet satellite, and the long history of Chinese conquest and Sino-Vietnamese conflict would also limit the role of Great Powers in defining the DRV.[ citation needed ]
Vis-a-vis Great Powers and the S, however, the situation was quite different. John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower assistants had a priority of stopping Communism everywhere, and saw South Vietnam as a central barrier to Communist expansion.[seven] Diệm, despite his personal rigidity, distrust of those outside his immediate circle, and minority ethnicity and religion, was, most importantly to the U.Southward., neither pro-Communist nor pro-French. That he was a nationalist was secondary. The ideal of U.South. policy was for Diệm to form a representative government, oust Bảo Đại, and innovate democracy. French relations with the U.Due south., with France seen every bit an important anti-Communist resource in Europe, complicated the state of affairs. The French administrator to the U.S. warned John Foster Dulles that American back up was being offered to Diệm without conditions that he form a stable and representative regime. Guy le Chambre, French minister for the Associated States (i.e., Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) reportedly felt Diệm would lead the country into disaster, but, since the U.S. had and then visibly supported him,
We would adopt to lose in Vietnam with the Us than to win without them...we would rather support Diệm knowing he is to lose and thus keep Franco-US solidarity than to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world if this meant breaking Franco-United states of america solidarity.[8]
Events [edit]
1954 [edit]
Lieutenant Full general (LTG) Michael "Iron Mike" O'Daniel had been a U.S. observer in Indochina before Dien Bien Phu.[nine] Keyes Beech, a reporter for the Chicago Daily News, said that O'Daniel was optimistic of forming tank divisions and saving Dien Bien Phu, merely was both sensitive to, and contemptuous of, the French. Beech quoted him equally saying "I can sympathise why they are sensitive, but not what they are proud of."
In deference to French sensibilities and to ensure the seniority of the French Commander in Master in Indochina, O'Daniel relinquished his 3rd star and reverted to the rank of major general.
LTG O'Daniel was to have retired, but was convinced to come to Vietnam, in April 1954, as the 3rd head of MAAG-I. Lieutenant General John West. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.Southward. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), on iii trips to Indochina. General O'Daniel'due south visits were fabricated later General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on one April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded Full general Salan in May of the following year. With him was then-Lieutenant Colonel William B. Rosson, who would later ascension to high rank with the U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.
Agreements and arrivals in June [edit]
Ngô Đình Diệm arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bảo Đại, who had merely won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.
On June 15, O'Daniel had established an informal agreement for U.S. grooming of native forces, with General Paul Ély, who had replaced Navarre in the dual roles of French High Commissioner and commander of military forces. This arrangement, all the same, was not to be formalized until December.
The initial Key Intelligence Agency (CIA) squad in Saigon was the Saigon War machine Mission (SMM), headed by The states Air Forcefulness Colonel Edward Lansdale, who arrived on ane June 1954. The SMM was non function of the CIA Station in the Embassy. His diplomatic cover task was Assistant Air Attaché. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare.[four] Beech observed Lansdale to get an "adviser and confidant" of Diệm.[10]
Working in close cooperation with the United States Information Agency (USIA), a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Regular army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly afterwards, a refresher course in combat psychological warfare was synthetic and Vietnamese Ground forces personnel were rushed through it.
The second SMM member, MAJ Lucien Conein, arrived on July one. A paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his assist with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, he was the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. Conein was to have a continuing role, peculiarly in the coup that overthrew Diệm in November 1963. In Baronial, Conein was sent to Hanoi, to begin forming a guerilla organization. A second paramilitary team for the south was formed, with Army LT Edward Williams doing double duty as the just experienced counter-espionage officeholder, working with revolutionary political groups.
In Baronial, a National Intelligence Guess, produced by the CIA, predicted that the Communists, legitimized by the Geneva agreement, would take quick control of the North, and plan to take over all of Vietnam. The judge went on that Diệm's government was opposed both by Communist and non-Communist elements. Pro-French factions were seen as preparing to overthrow information technology, while Việt Minh would have a longer view. Nether command of the n, Viet Minh individuals and small units volition stay in the s and create an hole-and-corner, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations. [11]
The final agreement betwixt France and the U.S. was drafted between the senior French official in Vietnam, General Ely, and Full general J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower's special envoy to Saigon, on thirteen December.[12] Collins had served as Primary of Staff of the Army, and was the U.S. representative to the NATO Military Commission until 1956. His additional duties to Saigon were inside the scope of the U.South. defense organization centered on NATO; he had the personal diplomatic rank of Ambassador. This was his last assignment before retirement.[13] Collins, in late 1954 and early 1955, supported the French recommendation that Diệm could not unify the Vietnamese nationalists.[14]
1955: Establishing ii Vietnams [edit]
Cardinal Francis Spellman, in the region to visit U.Southward. troops, came to Vietnam in early January, celebrated masses, and gave a donation to Catholic Relief Services. While various reports suggested Spellman was Diệm's patron in the U.S., it seems likely that his visit was ane for his coreligionists. Obviously, Spellman would non exist unhappy with a Catholic leader, but the U.S. was quite aware that Diệm'due south Catholicism isolated him from the majority of South Vietnamese. When an Australian key visited Vietnam shortly subsequently, J. Lawton Collins suggested to Diệm's brother, the Bishop of Huế, that there exist a moratorium on high-level Cosmic visits. Collins suggested that these visits aggravated the isolation of Diệm from the majority.
Lansdale also advised confronting Diệm being too visible with his Catholicism, citing an anti-Catholic bias in U.S. politics and a concern about creating a "Vatican country". As a response to Spellman's visibility as a member of the bureaucracy, Lansdale encouraged U.S. support of Dr. Tom Dooley, a dr. volunteer for the "Passage to Freedom" refugee plan, who was Catholic just not clerical.[fifteen]
The U.S. and France, going into 1955, were dubious of Diệm'due south ability to unify South Vietnam, but there was no obvious alternative: anti-French, nationalist, anti-Bảo Đại. The French supported the Vietnamese National Army chief of staff, Gen. Nguyễn Văn Hinh. Hinh, working with the Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, and Bình Xuyên, failed to organize a insurrection.
In January, the Republic of Vietnam received its first straight shipment of military machine supplies from the U.S. The U.Due south. also offered to train the fledgling National Army. A paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Advisers of Support.
On February 12, 1955, the U.S. assumed responsibility for training Vietnamese forces, and the French disassociation began.[sixteen]
In Tây Ninh on February 22, the "United Forepart" against Diệm was formed, composed of Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, Dan Xa Dang, Lien Minh and Bình Xuyên representatives. On 28 April, Diệm, against U.Due south. advice, against French advice, and confronting the advice of his cabinet, moved once again against the sects.
In June, concerned that Viet Minh might win, Diệm abolished elections for village councils.[17] Traditionally, the village level was autonomous. Past replacing it at all, he inherited responsibility for corruption at that level. His appointments were usually from outside the villages; outsiders that he considered "dependable" Catholics, Northerners, or others not tied to the rural culture. This drove the villagers to the sort of conspiracy that they used confronting the French.
The Geneva agreements had specified the start of consultations on the 1956 referendum would begin, between Hanoi and Saigon, in July 1955.[eighteen] Diệm refused to enter into talks. On twenty July, Vietnam announced that it would not participate in talks for the reunification of Due north and South Vietnam through the elections that were scheduled for the following year, according to the Geneva agreements.[nineteen] Diệm pointed out that his government had not signed the Geneva agreements, and thus was not subject area to them. The U.S. did not—every bit is often declared—connive with Diệm to ignore the elections. The U.S. expected elections to exist held and fully supported them.[17]
Northern developments [edit]
In 1999, Robert McNamara wrote that both sides had missed opportunities. As he entered government in 1960, he freely admits he knew little almost Vietnam, just his colleagues, ranging from the President and Vice President, to the Secretary of State and Chairman of the Articulation Chiefs of Staff were convinced that Prc and the Soviet Union saw Vietnam as the starting point for the Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. Postwar discussions between McNamara and N Vietnamese told him that the Hanoi leadership saw the U.Due south. as the main enemy, "imperialists" bent on burdensome the N and occupying the entire country. His 1999 conclusion (his accent) was
Only what was the reality? Hanoi was no domino! Washington was no imperialist!...In 1961 the North Vietnamese government and the Kennedy Administration saw each other through fifteen years of Common cold War rhetoric. [20]
Both sides, according to McNamara, had missed opportunities both afterward the end of the Second World War, and at the Geneva conferences. In 1945, China was in civil state of war, and some of the Vietnamese politicians in exile were in People's republic of china. An Role of Strategic Services team, commanded by MAJ Archimedes Patti, had been in Red china with the Vietnamese, and moved south with them; Washington paid little attending to their reporting, but Ho did not follow up the lack of response.[21] According to Luu Doan Huynh, in Nov 1998, the Vietnamese were shocked that the Soviets and Chinese, their "big friends", were near to divide Vietnam. Huynh said his delegation failed, given that as encouragement, to seek out the Americans and explicate the nationalist position. An American diplomat, Chester Cooper, was at the conference, and said he could never decide to whom, or if, the North Vietnamese were "reporting".[22]
Autumn and winter; the fall of Diệm opponents [edit]
On 26 October Ngô Đình Diệm became President and Commander-in-Chief subsequently defeating Bảo Đại in the referendum about the hereafter form of government.[19] The referendum, however, seemed less than ideally honest; Diệm's overall margin over Bảo Đại was 98.2 percent, and Diệm received 605,000 votes from the 405,000 registered voters of Saigon.[23]
In America, President Eisenhower pledged his support for the new government and offered military aid. U.S. representatives told Hinh that another coup try would cut off U.Southward. aid. Diệm ordered Hinh out of the country in September, but Hinh refused. Eventually, Bảo Đại invited Hinh to France, and Hinh left Vietnam on November xix.
Dec was a time of land reform in both North and S. In the North, it was a menstruum of ideological purges, with thousands of landowners executed or imprisoned (see Giap below).
In 1955, the outset role of Diệm's land reforms involved resettling refugees and other land destitute Vietnamese on uncultivated country;[17] the ownership of this land was not always clear.
1956 [edit]
Under the French, the Montagnard tribes of the Central Highlands had had autonomy from the lowland colonial government. In 1956, these areas were absorbed into the Republic of Vietnam, and Diêm moved indigenous Vietnamese, equally well as refugees from the North, into "country development centers" in the Central Highlands. Diệm intended to assimilate the unwilling tribes, a point of ethnic resentment that was to become 1 of the many resentments against Diệm.[24] These resentments both cost internal back up, and certainly were exploited by the Communists.
The United states of america Military machine Assistance Informational Grouping (MAAG) assumed responsibility, from French, for training South Vietnamese forces.
Equally office of a response to excesses in Northern state reform, for which Ho dismissed Trường Chinh as caput of the program, Võ Nguyên Giáp, in the fall of 1956, offered the self-criticism for the Party:
We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on also large a front end and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread. . . . Whilst conveying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas . . . in regions inhabited by minority tribes we take attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local community and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social grade instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications lone. Instead of recognizing pedagogy to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures [using punishment].[17]
In late 1956 one of the leading communists in the south, Lê Duẩn, returned to Hanoi to urge that the Vietnam Workers' Party have a firmer stand on national reunification, but Hanoi hesitated in launching a full-scale military struggle. In the fall of 1956, Diệm dealt strongly with some other group not considered of his circle: the approximately 1,000,000 Chinese-identified people of Vietnam, who dominated much of the economy.[25] He barred "foreigners", including Chinese, from 11 kinds of businesses, and demanded the half-million Vietnamese-born men, known every bit "uncles", "Vietnamize", including irresolute their names to a Vietnamese form. His vice-president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was put in charge of the program.
1957 [edit]
As opposition to Diệm's dominion in South Vietnam grew, a low-level insurgency began to have shape at that place in 1957, conducted mainly past Viet Minh cadres who had remained in the south and had hidden caches of weapons in case unification failed to take place through elections. This widespread campaign of terror included bombings and assassinations. Guerilla attacks reported included the killing of a group, not further identified, of 17 people in Châu Đốc in July, 1957. A Commune chief and his family were killed in September. In October, the clandestine radio of the "National Conservancy Movement" began to circulate back up for armed opposition to Diệm. By year's end, over 400 S Vietnamese officials were killed. Operations appeared to solidify in October, beyond what might take been small group actions:
In Washington, U.Due south. intelligence indicated that the "Viet Minh underground" had been directed to carry boosted attacks on U.Due south. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." U.S. intelligence also noted a total of 30 armed "terrorist incidents initiated by Communist guerillas" in the last quarter of 1957, too equally a "large number" of incidents carried out by "Communist-pb [sic] Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài dissident elements", and reported "at least" 75 civilians or civil officials assassinated or kidnapped in the same period.[17]
In Dec 1957, the Soviet Union and Mainland china agreed to proposals to seat both the North and Due south, as contained countries, in the Un. Their decision was based on a growing east-west détente, but the North Vietnamese saw information technology equally a sellout of their goal of reunification, and this may accept led to their decision, in 1959, to seek reunification through armed forces ways.[26]
Elbridge Durbrow became U.S. Ambassador in April, succeeding G. Frederick Reinhardt.
1958: North Vietnam looks South [edit]
Outset with a plantation raid in January and a truck ambush in February, steady guerilla ambushes and raids became more regular in 1958, and of serious business concern to the GVN. This intensity level was consistent with Mao'due south Phase I, "the menstruum of the enemy'due south strategic offensive and our strategic defensive."[27] Mao's use of "strategic defensive" refers to the guerilla force making its presence known and building its organization, but not attempting to engage military machine units. George Carver, the principal CIA analyst on Vietnam, said in a Foreign Affairs article,
A pattern of politically motivated terror began to sally, directed against the representatives of the Saigon regime and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter considering their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed non but confronting officials simply confronting all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activeness mounted slowly and steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong", constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability
On March 7, President Diệm received a letter from North Vietnam Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng proposing a discussion on troop reductions and trade relations as a renewed stride towards reunification. On 26 Apr, Diệm rejected any discussion until North Vietnam had established "democratic liberties" similar to those in the Due south. A coordinated control construction was formed by Communists in the Mekong Delta where 37 armed companies were existence organized in June 1958. North Vietnam invaded Lao people's democratic republic and occupied parts of the state. Fall reported that the GVN lost near 20% of its village chiefs through 1958.[17]
1959 [edit]
On March 1959, the armed revolution began as Ho Chi Minh declared a People's War to unite all of Vietnam nether his leadership. His Politburo now ordered a changeover to an all-out military struggle. Thus began the Second Indochina War.
On July 1959, North Vietnam invaded Lao people's democratic republic, opening the get-go tracks of what was to become the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
References [edit]
- ^ Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War
- ^ Eckhardt, George S. (1991), Vietnam Studies: Control and Control 1950-1969, Center of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army , pp.half dozen-7
- ^ Eckhardt, p. 8
- ^ a b "Document 95, Lansdale Team'south Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1, pp. 573–83
- ^ a b "Book 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56", Section 3, pp. 314-346", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume i
- ^ Sorley, Lewis (Summer 1999), "Courage and Blood: Due south Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion", Parameters , p. 15
- ^ Patti, Archimedes L. A. (1980). Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America'due south Albatross. Academy of California Printing. ISBN0-520-04156-9. , pp.443-444
- ^ Patti, p. 444
- ^ Ted Gittinger, ed. (March 22, 1983), Oral interviews of Keyes Beech (PDF)
- ^ Beech, p. I-5
- ^ Central Intelligence Agency (three Baronial 1954), National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 63-5-54: Mail-Geneva Outlook in Indochina (PDF)
- ^ "Ely-Collins Agreement is Drafted – December 13, 1954". vietnamwar50th.com . Retrieved 2020-04-24 .
- ^ Conversations with General J. Lawton Collins, Gainsay Studies Establish, U.S. Army Control and Full general Staff College, 1983, Combat Studies Found No. five
- ^ Patti, p. 446
- ^ Anderson, David L. (2000), The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era, Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN9780842027632 , p. 10-eleven
- ^ "Volume one, Affiliate iv, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56, Section 1, pp. 179-214", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume ane
- ^ a b c d e f "Volume one, Affiliate 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in Southward Vietnam, 1954–1960 Department i, pp. 242-69", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume ane
- ^ Patti, p. 447
- ^ a b Eckhardt, p. thirteen
- ^ McNamara, Robert Due south.; Bane, James; Brigham, Robert K.; Biersteker, Thomas J.; Schandler, Col. Herbert (1999), Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, PublicAffairs, ISBN1586486217 , pp.94-95
- ^ Patti, Archimedes A. H. (1981), Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America'southward Albatross, Academy of California Press
- ^ McNamara, pp. 96-97
- ^ Donaldson, pp. 86-87
- ^ Man Rights Lookout (April 2002), "III. A History of Resistance to Fundamental Authorities Command", Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts over Land and Religion in Vietnam'due south Key Highlands
- ^ TIME (May 13, 1957). "South Vietnam: 500,000 Uncles". Time magazine. Archived from the original on Oct 19, 2011. Retrieved May 4, 2010.
- ^ Donaldson, p. 88
- ^ Mao Tse-tung (1967), "On Protracted War", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press , pp. 136-137
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Vietnam_(1954%E2%80%931959)
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